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1.) Introduction 
The term „Money Laundering”
 3 originates from the US describing the Mafia’s attempt to 
“launder” illegal money via cash-intensive washing salons, which where controlled by 
company acquisitions or business formations. 
Estimated two to five per cent of the global gross domestic product stems from illicit sources.
4 
A great deal of the money derives from drug-dealing, with a total revenue of 810 Billion USD 
in 2003.
5 In 2005 the Austrian Police secured drugs worth 49266800 Euro (drug seizures in 
terms of street prices), in total 25.892 persons were charged for violation of the Austrian 
Narcotics Act.
6 (See table 1 and table 2). Most of all illegal transactions are processed by cash 
since there is the smallest risk to leave one’s mark;
 7 nevertheless there exists an obvious 
tendency to misuse the internet in order to undertake illicit transactions in form of Online-
Banking, Cyber money and Electronic Purse. 
2.) Illegal financial transactions 
Apart from the “official” economy there exists an “Underground Economy”, which 
characterizes the criminal economy by trying to evade business environment in order to gain 
monetary advantage. 
This illegal/crime Economy includes all sorts of criminal activity, which conflict with the 
legal system, e.g. organised crime or drug dealing. These profits generated by criminal 
operations are the object for the money laundering process. By way of example in 2004 nearly 
28 Million EURO of “black” money was frozen by Austrian authorities.
 8  
A characteristic criteria of Organised Crime is a tight and disciplined structure of the 
organization in combination with activities done on a grand scale. In 2004 in Germany for 
instance, 620 investigations linked to organised crime were made; the total amount of these 
losses identified reached 759 Million Euro with estimated profits amounting to 1,337,360,125 
                                                 
3 Compare Ertl, 2002, p. 8 and Courvat/Pless, 1993, p. 171f. 
4 Compare IMF, 1998. However the results are to some extend doubted, since they are irreproducible and not 
scientifically proven. See Riegler, 2004, p. 90ff. 
5 Own calculations. 
6 These figures only cover cannabis products, heroin, cocaine, XTC-pills and LSD-trips. Compare BMI, 2006, 
Suchtgiftmittelbericht 2005, p. 4. 
7  Compare Vanempten, 1994, p. 24f. Hereunto the FIU Germany: „..Cash transactions continue to play a 
significant role in a large number of cases. Evidently, offenders are aware and continue to deliberately exploit 
the advantage of “interruption of the paper trail” afforded by cash transactions. Particularly significant in this 
context are the very large amounts involved in some of these cash transactions..“ FIU, 2004 p. 42.  
8 Compare BMI, 2005. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 3  
Euro, however, provisionally seized assets only added up to a total value of 68 Million Euro 
in the course of these investigations.
9 
Organised Crime in Middle-Europe is quantified in the following way: The largest part of it is 
made of drug trafficking (40%), followed by the trade of arms with 20 per cent and the 
economic crime (15 per cent).
10 (See figure 1) 
In order to get back/return the earnings generated by illegal activities into legal businesses, 
some kind of acquitting has to be done, prior to reusing it again. This process is called money 
laundering, which is not to be mixed up with tax fraud or flight of capital. (See table 3) 
Whereas Unreported/Shadow Economy means (legal) economical activity which is deprived 
from associated social contributions, taxation etc, and absconds from justice and therefore 
produces “grey” money (fiscal fraud). 
Shadow economy (i.e. in principal legal activities, but with holding tax and social security 
payments, and violating other labour market regulations) and underground economy are 
different activities, which can not be summed up as the underground economy (typical crime 
activities, like burglary, drug dealing, etc.) produces no positive value added for an economy. 
Hence, they can not be treated as a complement to the official GDP, whereas to the traditional 




3.) Necessity of Money Laundering Activities 
According to some estimations, the total turnover of organised crime actually reaches figures 
between 500 billion and 2.1 trillion USD. Indeed, the world-wide volume of Money 
Laundering obtains due to some studies 400 billion to 2.85 trillion USD. (See table 4) 
Money laundering is necessary since nearly all illegal transactions are done by cash; all the 
more because cash leaves no marks on information carriers like documents or evidence.
 12  
An important role is played by Drug-Trafficking, with total revenue of 500 to 1000 billion 
USD equally to nine per cent of the worldwide trade.
13 The UNDOC World Drug Report 
                                                 
9 Compare BKA, 2005, p. 14 and 16.  
10 Compare Siska, 1999 and own calculations. 
11 Schneider, p 3. 
12 Compare Vanempten, 1994, p. 24f. 
13 Compare Bongard 2001, p. 55 and p. 181. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 4  
2005 found out that during the observation period about 200 Million people- which 
correspond approximately to 5 per cent of the world’s population- consumed drugs at least 
once. Therefore the extent of the illegal drug-market is enormous: “The value of the global 
illicit drug market for the year 2003 was estimated at US$13 bn at the production level, at $94 
bn at the wholesale level (taking seizures into account), and at US$322 bn based on retail 
prices and taking seizures and other losses into account. Nonetheless, the size of the global 
illicit drug market is substantial. The value, measured at retail prices, is higher than the GDP 
of 88% of the countries in the world”.
14 By comparison, in 2004 drugs with an estimated 
black-market value of 33.333.000 Euro were secured in Austria.
15 
These immense sale volumes and profits of drug-trafficking need to be laundered: One 
million USD in 20 dollar-notes weighs approximately 55 kg; the same sum in five dollar-
notes scales 220 kg.
16 
 
4.) Definition of Money Laundering 
4.1 ) Legal Definition: 
The term „Money Laundering“ was firstly used in 1973 during the Watergate Scandal and is 
therefore no original legal definition but a colloquial paraphrase describing the process of 
transforming illegal into legal assets.
17 
Based on US-American approaches a supranational definition of money laundering was 
created by the United Nations Convention on Drugs and an EU-directive, which had to be 
converted into the national law of all Member States.  
 
4.1.1.) Germany 
As an example approximately 100 billion Euros are laundered in Germany per year.
18 
Germany’s Criminal Code determines in § 261 punishments in case of a statement of facts 
concerning money laundering: 
Anyone who hides, obscures the origin of, or prevents or jeopardizes the 
determination of the origin, the finding, the forfeiture, the confiscation or the seizure 
                                                 
14 UNDOC, 2005, p. 5  and p. 127. 
15 Compare BMI 2005, Suchtmittelbericht Österreich 2004. 
16 Compare Siska 1999, p. 28.  
17  Compare Ertl, 2002, p. 8. 
18 See http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/18.11.2005/2180342.asp 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 5  
of an object which originated from a felony committed by another person or a 
misdemeanour committed by another person or by a member or criminal association 
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to five years or by a fine. 
19 
  
The object must be due from an illegal act of another person and both concealment and 
thwarting are punishable. However no punishment is being threatened if assets are disguised 
which have arisen from ones own crimes or offences. The statutory framework of a maximum 
penalty is an imprisonment of five years; in case of gang membership or operation on a 
commercial basis an imprisonment up to ten years can be imposed. 
4.1.2.) Austria  
Anyone who conceals or disguises the origin of property that originate in the crime of 
another, particularly by giving false information, in legal proceedings, regarding the 
origin or true nature of those property items, the ownership or other rights to them, 
the power of disposition over them, their transfer or their whereabouts, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term of up to two years or with a monetary fine of 
up to 360 daily rates.
20 
  
According to the existing law in this country money laundry means the process of converting 
felonious gained proceeds with the goal to hide their illegal origin. The object of money 
laundering form all assets resulting from criminal activities, which explicitly contradict the 
legal code, among them for example terrorist organisations. Though punishable is only a 
person who veils assets of another person which are due either from a crime or from offences 
that are enumerated in § 165 StGB, as for instance bribery, smuggling or falsification of 
documents. As a result there is no penalty for any kind of „white washing“ one’s own 
criminal assets.  
In contrast to other legal systems there exists no separate money laundering law in Austria, 
criminal offence is regulated in the Austrian’s penal code (StGB), in addition numerous 
obligations exist in the banking law (BWG), in the GeWO, the gambling law … 
 
                                                 
19 English translation of Germany’s penal code. See 
https://www.imolin.org/amlid/showLaw.do?law=6301&language=ENG&country=GER 
20 English translation of Austrian’ s penal code of 1993. See 
https://www.imolin.org/amlid/showLaw.do?law=5951&language=ENG&country=AUS 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 6  
4.2.) Criminological characteristics of Money Laundering  
All monetary assets (cash and book money (electronic bank transfers)) or their surrogates as 
well as non-monetary assets such as moveable goods and real estates which are generated 
directly or indirectly from a punishable action or are intended for the realization of such an 
activity are considered as an object of money laundry. The intended purpose of the 
transformation is to wash illicit assets in a form of legal usability. The proceeding is thereby 
characterised by a criminal intent to purposefully, systematically transform, mix, transfer, 
convert and deceive the true origin or nature of incriminated objects. 
 
5.) The stages of Money Laundering by Cash 
Money laundering basically shows the following three stages: 
First illegal profits are placed (the placement), which means the physical infiltration of cash 
(coming from crime) into the financial system. This money is then converted into book 
money (primary and secondary deposit) which is finally followed by a layering process 
(stacking of illegal funds). These sophisticated acts are used to veil the origin of the money by 
creating complex financing transactions between different states and piling up several layers 
of dealings. Reintegration and Parking of this illegal money, which shows no connection to 
organised crime and is converted into outwardly visible asset, make up the third stage through 
investments in a business, industrial enterprises, tourism projects. 
5. 1.) Placement  
At the first initial stage termed placement, ill-gotten gains from punishable preactions are 
infiltrated into a legal bank/economic system; at this junction there is an increased risk of 
being revealed.  
5.1.1.) Primary deposit 
By which one understands immediate placement of illicit revenues into a legal financial 
system without attracting attention of regulatory agencies. With the help of „structuring“ and 
„smurfing“ limiting amounts are undermined in order to avoid identification, obligations to 
report and documentation required. Besides, money is split up systematically in partial 
amounts as to permit inpayment in several bank accounts below respective identification and 
declaration borders. In Austria these regulations don’t apply to savings deposits up to a figure 
of 15000 Euro. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 7  
Another method of placement represents the influencing control on institutes of the financial 
sector in terms of purchasing existing banks or starting-up new banks in offshore countries. 
(„company havens“ or „bank havens“). Moreover corruption of co-workers is a commonly 
used illegal instrument to place incriminated money: Thereby attempts are made to socialise 
with bank employees in order to allow direct infiltration of money without attracting attention 
of supervisory authority. Depositing currency to bank accounts abroad provides an 
opportunity to enter financial or economic cycle as well. 
5.1.2.) Secondary deposit 
Unlike primary deposit, secondary deposit is an indirect infiltration of money supply into the 
Bank system and thus a conversion into book money through interconnection of a natural or 
legal person. This happens either by changing the medium, while incriminated money is 
converted into other assets, or via front men, who are acting on their one’s behalf but  -
without being manifested on the surface – trade for account of a third party  or grant the using 
of their name in order carry out (realise) an account opening, founding of a company or 
conclusion of an insurance policy.    
Indirect Placement can also be accomplished by forward displacement of the money 
laundering location onto life insurances, financial service provider and exchange offices. 
At present many offers are sent via email or quoted at homepages to occupy as a “financial 
agent”, to provide (German or Austrian) banking accounts, which are used to remit illegal 
proceeds so as to veil transfer ways.
 21 
A further technique to launder money is the setting-up of front companies, which are in 
opposition to front men corporate bodies, that infiltrate black money on their banking 
accounts and therewith into the fiscal system by means of feigned turnovers. An essential 
condition is cash-intensive business (e.g. gastronomy, import-export companies, car trade, 
hotel sector, auctioneers and galleries). Partly no phantom company/dummy company is 
launched but only respective documents of foundation are being counterfeited.  
For example 25 000 customers of life insurances are under strong suspicion of laundering 




                                                 
21 See http://www.daserste.de/plusminus/beitrag_dyn~uid,7x6o6i1cla2hntlx~cm.asp 
22 See http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/18.11.2005/2180342.asp 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 8  
5. 2.) „Layering“ 
By dint of the so called layering stage criminals attempt to conceal the source of illegal 
income through a great deal of transactions by moving around black money. Transaction 
intensity and transaction speed are increased withal (multiple transfer and transaction); 
electronic payment systems plus diverging jurisdiction and inefficient cooperation of criminal 
prosecution often simplify/facilitate the layering processes as well. A legitimation of capital 
transfer is thereby accomplished by over- and under invoicing at international commercial 
transactions, by charging fictive goods or services in form of winding up bogus transactions 
or by back to back loan. In this case money launderers lodge a certain amount of money to a 
banking account (or plausibly prove securities adequate at value on another bank) in order to 
subsequently retrieving the same sum as bank loan afresh/again. If so a money launderer 
raises his own capital and is though in possession of a proof of origin concerning the bank 
loan. Instead of banks affiliated companies can be lenders alike. 
Misusage of financial derivatives and swaps is by the same token occurring commonly among 
money launderers to cloud the original derivation of incriminating funds. On this occasion 
two offshore companies, which are merely separate de jure but de facto controlled by just one 
person, conclude an option contract, by taking each either “long” or “short” position. The loss 
of one is compensated by the profit of the other. Financial volume of offshore-centres adds up 
to approximately 10-12 billion USD, furthermore it is assumed that annual growth amounts 
15 per cent.
 23 
5. 3.) Integration 
In this third stage infiltration of transformed and transferred capital into formal economy by 
means of financial investments (specific deposits, stocks) or property (direct investment in 
real estates and companies) is primarily completed in countries
24 promising extraordinary 
short odds. 
 
6.) Identification of money laundering techniques 
Identification of incriminated money takes place both at the initial point of the entry of the 
funds into the financial system and in other stages (layering and integration) of money 
laundering since infiltrated money is identifiable by paper trail. Reconstruction of these 
                                                 
23 Compare IMF, 2002. 
24  Riegler, 2004, p. 41. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 9  
money trails is obtained with assistance of various methods of cash-flow analysis. Whilst 
direct analyses examines and compares involved parties and transactions which are already 
documented, indirect analyses carries out cash flow on the basis of constructing a financial 
profile of the suspect.  
The indirect analysis can be executed in form of an equity capital analysis, by means of which 
-starting from a base year- changes in net assets are put in relation to known cash inflows and 
outflows of funds over a several period of time, an expenditure analyses (comparison of cash 
inflows and outflows of funds) as well as an incoming payment analysis, with which the sum 
(disturbance variable validated) of all banking deposits is put in relation to known cash 
inflows.  
 
7.) Quantification/Estimation of money laundering volume 
Unfortunately the estimation (table 3) of money laundering volume which is not easy even at 
land level turns out to be very difficult on a world-wide basis tough and poses fundamental 
questions: Estimations are afflicted with large uncertainties. 
Apart from diverging definitions of the term „money laundering“ on national and 
international level particularly transaction-intensive layering stage proves due to potential 
double and multiple counting exceedingly error prone, furthermore many figures are made up 
of estimates (e.g. drug profits) or based on figures that are wrong quoted or misinterpreted. 
Basically there is a distinction made between direct and indirect methods of quantification: 
Direct methods focus on recorded payment flow statements and hence should provide – at 
first glance - exact data. However they are often incorrect due to merely estimated numbers of 
unreported cases (indistinguishability of legal and illegal funds in bank and financial system): 
for example discrepancy analysis of international balance of payment, changes in cash stocks 
of national banks. An exception is an adduction of confiscated assets and accordingly money 
laundering delicts, which were already detected. Since only individual cases are concerned, 
projection is not feasible.
 25  
Whereas indirect methods identify the amount of money laundering by deducing sizes of 
causally linked fields. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Compare Riegler, 2004, p. 65ff. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 10  
7.1.) Econometric technique of estimation  
By choosing this technique dependent variables (drug supply (output rated at sale prices)) as 
well as independent variables (drug demand (demand behaviour of consumers) and 
extrapolation), drug selling prices and confiscation (drug volume and extrapolation) are 
considered. 
7.2.) 10%-Rule of FATF 
On basis of the estimated annual turnovers on retail trade level, the assumption of 
confiscating 10 per cent of drugs floating around as well as operating cost quota (relating to 
sales) in amount of 10 per cent, profits of drug trafficking were estimated: Per 1997 this 
showed a drug-turnover of approx. 300 billion USD, 122 billion USD profits thereof and 85 
billion USD were classified as relevantly to money laundering thereby).
 26 
 
8.) Fight against Money Laundering 
8.1.) Austria 
8.1.1.) Fundamental measurements:  
The main component of all existing money laundering precautions is formed by the so called 
“Know your Customer” principle; the FIU (Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit) has to be 
informed by all notifiable aggrieved parties as soon as a suspect exceeds standardised limits. 
By banning anonymous savings bank books, identifying customers and obliging to store 
numerous documents etc. obligated parties comply with the “Know Your Customer” 
principle. Besides these, multitudinous reporting obligations exist in case of suspicion as well 
as the duty to stop transactions immediately. International pressure leads to observance of 
standards and to an establishment of a money laundering registration office (A-FIU), in 
addition many attempts are made to cooperate on an international level as far as money 
laundering is concerned. 
So far credit- and financial institutions are mainly aggrieved parties of the second money 
laundering EU-directive, however, other affected (exp. liberal) professions are “qualified” to 
act as middlemen (for instance, notaries, attorneys, accountants, auctioneers, casinos (for 
example by manipulating gambles or faked profits) and anyone who trades with high-quality 
goods such as gems/noble metal/art work) as well. Moreover, the EU Directive dictates 
                                                 
26 Compare FATF, 1999. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 11  
various obligations, namely to identify, register, document, store and provide information 
along with a stoppage of information and activity in case of a suspicious case. However, in 
June 2005 a new EU-Directive concerning money laundering was passed, which will have to 
be transposed into national law by 2007. Eventually, in 2007 every salesman will have to 
fulfil certain obligations these are to identify and store reports, if the payment exceeds 15000 
Euros in cash. In 2004 accounts with a total amount of 28 Million Euro were frozen due to 
suspicion of money laundering activities; Besides there were 373 suspicion reports (90 per 
cent of these come from credit- and financial institutions, solely 24 reports were made by 
others), 100 cases brought a charge according to § 165 penal code (StGB); Altogether 147 
pressed charges were delivered to crown prosecution service.
27 (See table 5) 
In order to systematize criminal proceedings, typologies were developed on a basis of 
suspicion reports and convictions:
28  
For example, staff members of a US-offshore-company settled various building projects in a 
Russian Federation, thereby bills were over-invoiced. Thereupon payment of the fraudulent 
derived surplus amount took place by means of oil deliveries and Russian contractors 
received “kick-back-payments” via different (partly Austrian) accounts in return. 
Even the internet is more and more often the scene of crime and is particularly used for 
fraudulent transactions:  
In one case a profit of up to one per cent a day was dangled on an internet-page in case of 
paying in a certain amount of equity capital. Admitted disbursement has never been made; the 
money had all disappeared and was presumably transferred abroad. It is to be assumed that at 
least 4000 people got victims to this deceitful act. 
Another time attempts were made to launder assets which were acquired in a deceptive way 
with the help of gambling. Several men changed ten thousands of Euros into gambling chips, 
entered the play hall, drank some beer, thereafter changed the unused coins into real cash 
again and thus attracted the attention of the gambling company.
  Investigations showed that 
these men were in disposition of an agent's authorities of some offshore- companies both at 
home and abroad and had laundered fraudulent funds reaching 1 Mio Euro through faked 
gamble winnings.
 29 
Moreover, starting from the US, criminals tried to alienate worthless investments via 
telemarketing; profits were collected on an account of an offshore-company and were 
                                                 
27 Compare BMI, 2005.  
28 There is no standard of typology so far. 
29 Compare BMI, 2005 and BMI, 9-10/05.     23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 12  
transferred to Spain afterwards. Thus the damage rose up to 100 million USD; more than 
2000 aggrieved parties could be elicited.
30 
In 2004 the majority of all money laundering cases in Austria were carried out by means of 
offshore-companies, money remittance systems or ARS-Systems (Alternative Remittance 
System
31).  
 8.2.) International 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international organization, fighting against 
money laundering and terrorism financing, consisting of 33 members, tries to shunt those 
non-cooperative countries with the help of a “name and shame” policy by publishing a “black 
list”. Moreover, it is trying to combat money laundering internationally by means of 
typologies and 40 recommendations (international standards).  
Currently only Myanmar and Nigeria are still quoted on FATF’s list. 
8.3.) Germany 
Germany established a competence centre named „Zentralstelle für verfahrensunabhängige 
Finanzermittlung“ to fight money laundering. In addition, control over financial transactions 
was extended combined with the establishment of a central database at the 
“Bundesaufsichtsamt für Kreditwesen” in order to visualize cash flow of terrorism and money 
laundering organisations. Furthermore, the authorisation of the current supervisory body (eg 
„Bundesaufsichtsamt für Wertpapierhandel“ oder „Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
Versicherungswesen“) was extended. In 2004, 8764 first time hints referring to money 
laundering offences were brought up in Germany.
32  
The following typologies could be developed in this context: 
Contemporary atypical bank transfers to third parties were disposed onto numerous 
investment accounts, which where kept by members of a certain ethnicity and which were 
intended to be used for long-time investments. In addition, the fact that attracted attention, 
was that account opening was done through only one (unique) middleman combined with the 
foundation of companies without any identifiable business activity (moreover, respective 
management was taken over by members of this ethnicity). 
                                                 
30 Compare BMI, 2005. 
31 ARS = Any system used for transferring money from one location to another and generally operating outside 
the banking channels. The services encompassed by this broad definition of ARS range from those managed by 
large multinational companies to small local networks. They can be of a legal or illegal nature and make use of a 
variety of methods and tools to transfer the money. FATF/GAFI, 2005, p. 3.  
32 Compare FIU, 2004, p. 47. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 13  
Another account, which was kept for a foreign banking customer for the settlement of an 
offshore-company, was used to purchase gold, after the customer had received a foreign credit 
note amounting to a six-figure sum of money in Euro. Shortly afterwards resale –involving 
loss - and bankwire of these sale revenues to an offshore-company (by means of a third 
country) took place. Paper trail should therefore remain undetected by acquisition of goods 
and reselling.  
In another case, large transfer amounts were repeatedly set down to an account, this money 
was then transmitted to separate accounts (of the account holder) in offshore-countries, for 
example, in form of three remittances amounting over one million Euros. This customer, 
whose domicile lay in an offshore-country and who was a tax counsel and auditor, was - by 
his own admission – mainly acting for German investors. Thus it was just a flowing collective 
account, with which a client’s money could be transferred by bundle onto accounts in 
offshore-countries in order to be laundered.
33 
 
9.) Newest developments 
New technologies in the range of payment methods allow economic transactions without any 
restriction by legal and territorial barriers or by state controls. 
9.1.) Electronic purse („prepaid cards“, „smart cards“) 
These smart cards, storing money electronically, seem appropriate to money laundering 
activities, especially the “white cards” since no account is necessary and loading as well as 
discharging are proceeded completely anonymously. Hence money laundering measures 
include limitations of the storable money, the transaction volume and the number of cards per 
person, additionally a card assignment to an authorised account is required.  
9.2.) „Online-Banking“ 
Online Banking designates world-wide financial transactions in the internet; money 
laundering at the same time can be prevented if orders carried out by the internet are 
depending on legitimised accounts.    
9.3.) „Cybermoney“ 
Unfortunately the only possibility to identify virtual money units in the internet (“ecash”) is 
given when the change of real cash into virtual money by a cybermoney-emitter takes place. 
                                                 
33 Compare FIU, 2004, p. 22 ff. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 14  
However this “handicap” is avoided by criminals through acquiring cyber-money emitters.
 34 
By paying with cybermoney there is no linking to an account, consequently no paper trail is 
left. The danger of malpractice is minimized if the usage of ecash services obligatory depends 
on an existing account relationship.   
Whereas FATF especially names the identification of customers as a major problem when 
using the internet for money laundering activities. All forms of payment transactions 
regarding new technology should therefore be carried out through legitimised accounts.
 35 
 
10.) Effects on macroeconomics  
10.1 Consequences to the balance of payments 
The significant increase of the balance of payment`s positions „errors and omissions“ 
(unexplained amounts) covers – according to IMF - in many cases undocumented capital 
movements; the cash flow with off-shore centres is often registered only by non-offshore 
countries.
36  
Besides distortion is often caused by back-to-back-loans, bogus transactions and over- and 
under-invoicing.  
10.2.) Effects on the money supply and the exchange rates   
IMF and FATF refer to unexplained fluctuations of demand for money in the eighties and 
nineties.
37  
10.3.) Effects on market prices and volatility 
There are no specific studies (concerning money laundering) about these effects; however, the 
development of money supply aggregates in the eighties and nineties could not be explained 
sufficiently. 
10.4.) Effects on the resource allocation and the economic growth  
The capital flow predominantly orients on favourable basic conditions for money laundering 
activities. The general public has to bear costs as a result of the extra expenditure for 
prosecution, health care and security.  
                                                 
34 Compare Altenkirch, 2002, p. 63ff. 
35  See http://www.ex.ac.uk/~watupman/undergrad/ron/explosion%20of%20money%20laundering.htm 
36 Compare Couvrat/Pless, 1993. 
37 Compare IMF 1996. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 15  
 
11.) Further effects to the (world) economy 
Distortions on capital markets lead to risks in the stability for the world economy: Financial 
crisis are thereby intensified unless even caused. In addition money laundering amounts to an 
infiltration of legal economic structures as well as to a crowding out/cut-throat competition. 
Furthermore the “dollarization” of the economy leads to substantial restrictions of fiscal and 
pecuniary political scope of national governments and banks of issues respectively. Besides 
economically weak states, which basically offer financial services, run risk of economical 
(and therewith political) dependence. Fight measures, necessary to combat money laundering, 
raise the price of legal activities as well as interfere in them on the capital markets. 
For example some German banks spend three-figure amounts of billions on fight measures.
38 
The „Deutsche Bank“, for instance, expends 15 billions Euro for sanctions against money 
laundering.
39 In addition money laundering causes an increase of corruption and criminality 
rates.  
                                                 
38 See: http://www.handelsblatt.com/pshb/fn/relhbi/sfn/buildhbi/cn/GoArt!204867,204886,981478/index.html 
39 See: http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/geldanlage/531574.html?nv=ct_mt 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 16  
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Charges under the Drug Law/Narcotics Act in Austria 2000-2005
 
Source: Following BMI, 2006, p. 23. 
 
Table 2 Charges in Upper Austria 2000-2005 (Narcotic Drugs Only) 
 
Source: Following BMI, 2006. 23/02/2010 Money Laundering: Some Facts    Page 17  
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Source: Compare Altvater, 2002/2004.   
 
Table 4   Quantification of Money Laundering Volume 
Origin/Study Year Volume (worldwide)
1998 1,3 trillion USD
2001 1,9 trillion USD
2003 2,1 trillion USD
UN-Estimates (New York; USA) 1994/98 700 billion to 1 trillion USD
International Monetary Fund and Interpol (Washington D.C; 
USA) 1996 500 billion USD
2001 800 billion USD
2002 960 billion USD
2003 1,2 trillion USD
2004 1,4 trillion USD
2005 1,5 trillion USD
1997 400 billion USD
2001 600 billion USD
2001 700 billion. USD
2002 750 billion USD
2003 810 billion USD
2004 915 billion USD
2005 1,039 trillion USD
Kerry 1997 420 billion -1 trillion USD
Schuster 1994 500-800 billion USD
Walker 1998 2,85 trillion USD
Schneider (University of Linz)
Worldwide turnover of Organised Crime: Range: 500 billion USD - 2,1 trillion USD
Worldwide money laundering turnover, as measured by drug total revenue:  400 billion – 2,85 trillion 
The Economist (London)
Schneider (University of Linz)
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS; Washington 
D.C.; USA)
Æ Estimates are afflicted with great uncertainties.  
Æ Problems due to an ambiguous  classification and a small databases regarding direct methods. 





















tax fraud  money laundering capital flight23.02.2010 WP25_Money Laundering Facts.doc 
Table 5   Fight against money laundering in Austria and Germany  
 
 
1994 1995 1996  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Suspicious transaction reports under  
§ 41/1 BWG Austria 
346 310 309  288 215 236 349 417 
Suspicious transaction reports 
pursuant to the Money Laundering 
Act Germany 
2873 2759 3019  7284 8261 6602 8062 9126 
Other suspicious transaction reports 
Austria 
  24 50 
Sum cash flow Austria  189 Mio €  80 Mio €  102 Mio €  516 Mio €  619 Mio €  692 Mio €  735 Mio €  843 Mio € 
















Sum of "frozen money" Austria  22 Mio €  27 Mio €  6 Mio €  32 Mio €  8 Mio €   2,2 Mio €  28 Mio €  99,3 Mio € 
Charges Austria  (§165 StGB)   20 50 13  74 115  -   100 70 
Charges Austria  (§278a StGB)  34 27 19  -    -   131 159  
All other charges  32 14 35  -    -    -   47 39 
 
 
Origin: Own calculations (indirect analysis on basis of estimates on shadow economy and class. criminal activities) ; Siska, Josef, 1999;  BMI,  2003 and 2005; FIU 2005 und 2006. 
 23.02.2010 WP25_Money Laundering Facts.doc 
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